date. The "deserving poor" was largely a negative description, referring to those who were not lazy and shiftless, but rather hard-working or, if unemployed, hopelessly infirm. Certainly, they were not poor because they rejected the virtues of hard work or the sanctity of private property. These sorts of persons were simply despised. Paupers, in the words of Robert Hunter, a sociologist and social worker writing at the turn of the century, did not wish to alter their way of living. . . . However, malarious and poisonous and undrained. they loved their valley of idleness and quiet; they hated the hill upon which they were constrained to toil; they shrank from its disappointments, its bruises, its weariness and bitterness and they were more contented than any other class I have happened to know.'
In contrast, the deserving poor were thought to have accepted the dominant business values, remaining poor through no real fault of their own.
What these people were "deserving" of was some sort of assistance, whether from government or private charity. Not too much, of course, for this would jeopardize "incentive": the poor's incentive to rise above their station and the working class' incentive to keep their jobs and not go on the dole. "If no body did Want no body would work," as the eighteenth-century wit, Bernard Mandeville observed, "but the greatest Hardships are look'd upon as solid Pleasures, when they keep a Man from Starving." 2 
Or as William Graham Sumner wryly put it when bemoaning the creeping humanitarianism of his age:
Poverty is the best policy. If you get wealth, you will have to support other people; if you do not get wealth, it will be the duty of other people to support you.3 One had to be eternally vigilant against the vice of excessive generosity. Thus, the New York State Board of Charities took note in its annual report for 1900 "Men of great literary achievements and profound political research have insisted that distress and poverty multiply in proportion to the funds created to relieve them, and that the establishment of any poor rates is not only unnecessary, but hurtful." 4 And yet during this period of industrialization, it must in fairness be pointed out, assistance was in fact enlarged. Public services expanded in fits of stops and starts, and charity became a status symbol for those who could afford it. For the urban party bosses, it became simply as essential as bait to a fisherman.5
From our elevated perch built on dozens of reforms that have accreted over the decades like layers of geological sediment, the past seems barbarous. We object, for one thing, to the degrading Calvinistic presumption of immorality which those with money attached to being poor. "Intemperance," the New York State Board of Charities stated drily, "has produced more than two-thirds of all the permanent pauperism in the state and more than one-half of the occasional pauperism." 6 Such a remark is bound to offend the modern reader, who has rechristened the drinking problem "alcoholism" and discussed methods of treating the illness at innumerable cocktail parties.
The old Calvinistic presumption of the immorality of the poor, to be sure, was not irrefutable. It could have been overturned. One way was through "hard work," a term occurring and recurring in nineteenth-century thought like the thud of textile looms in bustling New England mills. "There is no substitute for hard work," declared that great tinkerer Thomas Edison, following the law pronounced by the unacknowledged legislators of his world.
Work and thou wilt bless the day
Ere the toil be done; They that work not, can not pray, Can not feel the sun. God is living, working still, All things work and move; Work or lose the power to will, Lose the power to love.7
The Protestant ethic, then, meant that work was valued not only for what it produced but also as an activity uplifting in itself. But though hard work might have been vital to the poor man's salvation, it was insufficient to reverse the Calvinistic presumption on its own; for the presumption lay not in the minds of the poor, but instead in the minds of those with money whose actual acquaintance with the poor was slight. What was significant, therefore, was how the poor appeared to the outside world. Hard work was less important than being perceived as hard working (and also as uncomplaining). Nor was this as straightforward as it sounds, for those with money, like everyone else, tended to see in others what they wanted or expected to see and to be governed by stereotypes. They "knew" that the poor were repulsive: vulgar, crude, and as Orwell stressed, foul-smelling;8 and they "knew," too, that if the root of the poor's problem was not outright stupidity, it was likely to be sloth, intemperance, or lack of ambition. "Knowing" these things, those with money selected and interpreted facts they came in contact with so as to compel them to conform to their preconceptions. Disconfirming evidence was explained away or ignored.9 That those making these judgments had little in the way of personal relationships with the poor limited their reality-testing capacities and accentuated these distortion pressures. How hard it was for the poor to surmount an obstacle ensconced in the hostile minds of others! Another way for the poor to overturn the presumption of immorality was to contract a clearly incapacitating malady or injury. Again, it was less important that the person be physically prevented from working than that outsiders perceive him as such. Consequently, illnesses whose damage was internal and not visible to the casual observer, like miners' black lung, could not grant dispensation from the presumption. This should not suggest, however, that all obvious infirmities met the test, for it had to be plain beyond doubt that they were not the individual's own fault. Therefore, a person who lost a limb to a factory machine would be suspect and would have to convince outsiders that his injury had not resulted from his own carelessness. This general attitude permeated the law as well. If it could be shown that a worker contributed to his accident through any act of negligence, the employer frequently was relieved of all legal responsibility, even if his negligence had been more serious and long-lasting.10 Further, those engaged in dangerous work were often considered to have voluntarily assumed the risk of harm by taking the job and thereby to have relieved the employer of his legal obligations to them." In any case, the incapacitated deserving poor had to be perceived by outsiders not only as incapacitated through no fault of their own but also as grateful for the charity bestowed upon them by those acting under press of Christian duty.
The third way to overcome the presumption of immorality attaching to poverty was to cease being-or appearing-poor. This was not easily done; for if it was difficult to escape poverty, escaping too fast and too far might simply transform one from a member of the "deserving poor" into one of the "undeserving rich." Naturally, this was an improvement; but the galling stigma remained.12 Clearly, the basic intellectual assumption underlying the concept of the worthy poor was individualism.13 Individuals, it was felt, must be responsible for their own behavior; and if that causes them to be poor, they must live with it. Society does not owe them a living, though doubtless enough good people with money will keep the slackers alive through Christian charity. The most striking thing about these undeserving poor was how numerous they seemed to be as contrasted with the deserving poor who, as exceptions to the rule of individual responsibility, were few indeed.14 Thus, society's obligation which extended only to the deserving poor, was quite small. The others could-or should-rise from the depths by themselves.
Another A main reason for the great longevity and influence of the concept of the deserving poor was its profound legitimating power. The deserving poor's acceptance of the system-as manifested in their apparent belief in the value of hard work, their refusal to question the larger economic and social system, their unwillingness to complain publicly about their condition, and their obvious gratitude for aid from their betters-helped to convince the nonpoor that the society was just. After all, if the losers did not seem to question the rules of the game, they must be fair enough. Such reassurance was, of course, important to the winners; for they, like the rest of us, preferred to think that they had right on their side, as well as mere might.18
All of this seems naive and callous and unforgiveable to us. Yet there is about the notion of the deserving poor a certain rationality in that the economic and psychological self-interest of those with money was, at least, being served by their own artifice. Today, however, things are not quite that simple. This is not because the concept of the deserving poor has ceased to have any force or attraction. Quite the contrary. Though the term has been banished from the popular vocabulary like a vulgar guest from a cocktail party, the deserving poor is a notion very much with us. Nowadays the description is "underprivileged" or "disadvantaged"-words which seem neutral since they are not preceded by "deserving" or equivalent value judgments. Yet this neutrality, even at the verbal level, is mere illusion; the clear implication is that such people unjustly fall below the standard norm-they are not privileged or advantaged enough.19 17. Government, of course, was by no means absent from the economic arena, where its efforts were almost entirely pro-business, whether of an outright policy (for example, land grants to railroads, laws governing protective tariffs) or an ostensibly neutral "ground-rule" (for example, laws governing commercial transactions and labor relations) nature. 
Kristol, taking note of this, chides those who attack the existing distribution
What is confusing, however, is not the alteration in terminology but in those to whom the terms refer. In the days of the old deserving poor, it was pretty clear who they were and what characteristics they had to have. This is no longer the case.
Some persons still think of the "disadvantaged" in traditional terms as the hardworking poor or the incapacitated. The rhetoric has changed and the old assumptions have been modified somewhat, but the basic outlook persists. These are the persons who rail against welfare "chiselers" and those who "want something for nothing," and fear that expanded statesupported social services will sap lower class incentive and weaken moral fiber.20 This position is most closely identified with slightly old-fashioned Republicanism,21 but in its emphasis on hard work and private property it arouses far broader support among such groups as lower-middle-class Democrats as well.22
As widespread as this traditional view may be, however, it has been supplanted in print by a newer concept because most of the people doing "serious" writing on the subject of poverty take a different approach. For them, "underpriviliged" or "disadvantaged" are probably merely shortof income as unfair, pointing out that "no one seems willing to commit himself to a precise definition [of fairness] from which statesmen and social critics can take their bearing." Irving Kristol, "About Equality," Commentary (November, 1972), p. 41. It is surely true, as Kristol well knows, that it is hard to beat something with nothing; but requiring a high level of precision from broad social goals may, as a practical matter, merely constitute an argument for inaction. Further, the inability to identify some specific future distribution as "fair" may well be paralleled by a similar inability to defend the present distribution, as Kristol himself implicitly concedes when he remarks coyly that he professes "no strong prior opinion as to the 'proper' shape of an income-distribution curve" in America. For clearly his adversaries illustrate Edmond Cahn's famous observation that the sense of injustice, however subjectively defined, has been a far more significant impulse to social action than has the sense of justice.
20. Thus, a national poll revealed that three times as many respondents agreed as disagreed with the statement, "The relief rolls are loaded with chiselers and people who just don't want to work." Among those with family incomes less than $5,000, three-fifths agreed. Further, 27 percent of the total sample thought that lack of effort, either alone or combined with circumstances, is at the root of poverty, rather than circumstances alone; 68 percent of those with family incomes less than $5,000 concurred. vard urbanist, Edward C. Banfield. In The Unheavenly City he seems to argue that with the advent of the affluent society has come an assumption that middle class economic standards, loosely understood, ought to be the society's minimum acceptable standards for all. With delicacies apparently so abundant, the feeling grew-first among certain bourgeois intellectuals, and then among certain leaders of the poor-that everyone could and therefore should partake in the feast. Rising expectations, increasing faster than rising living standards, produced a rising sense of "relative deprivation, which is lack of enough to prevent one from feeling poor by comparison with others." Thus, at the very time that old-fashioned destitution and want were becoming less acute, poverty was perceived as becoming more acute. Carrying Banfield's argument a step further, those segments of the poor who complained loudest were naturally given credit for possessing the greatest sophistication and realism or, in other words, for being the most deserving. The poor who in an earlier day would have been labelled "deserving" were docile and white and, as a consequence, simply ignored by the self-designated "altruistic classes. A second answer asserts that the System works reasonably well but that this very success contributes to the Establishment's attacks on itself. The populist political essayist Eric Hoffer, for instance, sees American society in highly complimentary terms. Recent criticism he blames on the "alienated rich" and the snobbish intellectual, "a would-be aristocrat who loathes the sight, the sound and the smell of common folk." The rich feel guilty about their success and ill at ease in "the country of the common" and respond by confessing "the sins of our society in public." Not their private sins, understand, but "the sins of the rest of us, and it is our breasts they are beating into a pulp." Intellectuals, "fueled by a hunger for power," join the rich in "an alliance against those in the middle" and, more broadly, against traditional middle-class values in general.46 The Establishment seems to be at war with itself.
It was left to the great Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, however, to demonstrate most clearly the paradox that success is dysfunctional. The anti-Establishment impulse, he argued thirty years ago, flows not "primarily from grievance" nor can it "be met effectively by rational argument." Opposition, therefore, arises not from the growth in injustice that Lowi, Piven, and Cloward allege nor from the plastic vacuity Roszak and Reich claim to have found. Instead, it is the inevitable concomitant of the capitalist triumph. For capitalism, Schumpeter pointed out, exalts rationality, which removes "the restraint of sacred or semi-sacred tradition," loosens family ties, and institutionalizes stinging criticism of the existing order. In short, capitalism creates a critical frame of mind which, after having destroyed the moral authority of so many other institutions, in the end turns against its own; the bourgeois finds to his amazement that the rationalist attitude does not stop at the credentials of kings and popes disillusionment stems from the same political and social naivete that had earlier produced their excessive optimism. This observation, in turn, provokes several questions: Is it realistic to expect that brief moralistic outbursts of teen-aged activism would cause society to mend its ways? Ought society to be so assiduously responsive to these pressures, when this entails ignoring longer-lived beliefs of larger groups? Are the injustices of society so unambiguous and their remedies so obvious? Is it, in short, possible that the reason the walls refuse to tumble is that the student is not Joshua but instead just another overly ambitious college band trumpeter?
46. Eric Hoffer, "Whose Country Is America?" New York Times Magazine, November 22, 1970, pp. 120, 121. but goes on to attack private property and the whole scheme of bourgeois values. 47 Thus, capitalism is responsible not only for poverty but also for the moral outrage following it like a scream, a wound; thus, capitalism is responsible not only for the punitive view of the poor of Ronald Reagan, Russell Long, and the New York Daily News but also for the humane view of Lowi, Piven, and Cloward; thus, in short, capitalism is responsible not only for the Establishment but also for the hostility towards it many of the more comfortably situated citizens express with such vehemence and pleasure.
Yet, though conceding the accuracy of the Schumpeterian interpretation, it must be stressed that conflicts over the new deserving poor are not mere squabbles about phantoms. In the 1950's, poverty had been banished from liberal talk like a dull brother-in-law from a weekend vacation, and a narcissistic concern with middle class malaise permeated the bourgeois consciousness. Galbraith's affluent society48 was peopled by Whyte's organization men49 and Riesman's lonely crowd, 50 but not yet residents of Harrington's other America.51 By 1973, however, the middle class had long since rediscovered the poor. And while Hoffer and others may be right in blaming this rediscovery on unworthy motives, the fact is that poverty does indeed remain a major national problem. The 1970 census revealed 25.5 million poor persons, as determined by the federal government's floating poverty line. This represented one out of eight Americans, including one out of every six children under age six and one out of every four elderly persons. The "near-poor," whose income was less than twentyfive percent above the poverty line, accounted for another 10.2 million persons. Thus, the poor and near-poor-each of which category is significantly underreported in the census-comprise almost thirty-six-million people or about one-sixth of the entire population.52
That the new deserving poor represents a useful conceptual weapon in the war against poverty, however, remains unproven. Today's deserving poor owe their title to having rejected all that yesterday's deserving poor believed, especially as regards the justice and permanence of the ongoing social and economic order. By so doing, the new deserving poor legitimate not the current system but rather the current opposition to it; and instead of serving the Establishment, now serve its opponents. These opponents, though, may be planning and acting on the basis of a first-hand knowledge of their deserving poor that is often nearly as sketchy, sentimental, and inadequate as was the Establishment's knowledge of their deserving poor a couple of generations ago. Pawns in other strata's struggles, the new deserving poor may serve their own interests little better than did the old. The past surely counsels skepticism.
